language of the legal courts, and is well cited. The historical background of the formulation and progression of military governing laws over the years is extremely informative. However, I would limit my recommendation mainly to JAG students or other legal profession members. Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

UNMAKING THE BOMB: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Ad bellum pacem parati: Prepared in peace for war. Si vi pacem para pacem: If you want peace, prepare for peace.

Those two Latin phrases form an interesting contrast. The first phrase is the motto of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the school located just east of the Military Review offices. The second phrase graces the inside front cover of Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation. Each upholds a deep belief about our world, and a belief about what we must prepare for. Which of the two beliefs you hold may determine your reaction to this book. The authors discuss nuclear war, and how we can eliminate the possibility of nuclear war by eliminating the primary materials used to make a nuclear bomb: the fissile materials.

The book is an accessible and interesting look into the mind of disarmament proponents. It is written with minimal technical language and no math. If you can remember your high school physics, you will be comfortable with everything in this book. It is interesting because it documents the world of fissile material production, storage, and security. There are 470 endnotes that superbly lay out the sources of information for each technical assertion made by the authors. They definitely know their subject in great depth.

The book envisions a post-fissile world where all fissile materials are eradicated—or at least made inaccessible without enormous effort. The authors begin by extensively documenting their estimate of the current amount of fissile materials held throughout the world. They sum it all up to about 1,900 tons of fissile material in 2013: 1,400 tons of highly enriched uranium and 500 tons of separated plutonium. Since they estimate it only takes approximately four kilograms of plutonium or twelve kilograms of uranium to make a nuclear weapon, there is enough fissile material on earth now for more than one hundred thousand weapons. It is hard to not to agree that this is far more than is needed. Some current studies predict a nuclear winter after as few as one hundred nuclear detonations. The authors maintain that those large stockpiles may not be very safe in terms of thefts or attacks. They point to a study that postulated raiders of a storage facility could produce and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb before security forces could arrive to stop them. Even if decision makers are opposed to the complete elimination of fissile materials, they may still acknowledge a need to reduce the total quantity of those materials.

The authors propose a four-step action plan for complete elimination of fissile materials. First, gain transparency of all stockpiles so we know exactly what quantities are in existence. Second, stop all further production of fissile materials. Third, eliminate the materials in an irreversible method (various methods are proposed). Finally, ensure international verification of all these actions. In principle, this is a simple plan, but the difficulty is in the execution of the steps.

The vision of a world without the need for, or stockpiling of, nuclear fissile materials and hence no nuclear power plants and no nuclear weapons is thought provoking. It is also unlikely to be universally embraced, as even today there are new power plants and breeder reactors under construction in some countries still committed to nuclear
power. Nuclear-weapon states are still cloaking their weapons programs and do not appear likely to make them fully transparent. Nation states are jealous with sovereignty issues, and the step of turning all materials over to international verification seems unlikely. Putting a technological genie back in the bottle has historically been counter to human nature and perceived national interests.

This is a good book for learning about nuclear fissile material issues. It is enjoyable to read, and you will come out with a better appreciation for the global security threat posed by having excessive amounts of fissile materials spread throughout the world. Although the proposed vision of the complete elimination of fissile materials seems unlikely to be realized, it is an idea worthy of consideration.

Lt. Cdr. Harold A. Laurence, U.S. Navy, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WAGING WAR, PLANNING PEACE: U.S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars

Aaron Rapport, a lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, argues that conventional singularly centric theories on why U.S. political leaders make the decisions they do in war planning—particularly for postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations—are limited by their inability to account for the complex nature of war. He asserts that construal level theory (CLT) from the field of psychological research can better explain how political leaders consider noncombat operations in war planning.

The author believes long-term war planning by political leaders routinely emphasizes a desired military outcome while discounting the role of postconflict operations in achieving a strategic end state. Furthermore, their near-term planning focuses almost exclusively on achieving combat objectives—discounting the time and costs associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. There is a direct correlation between the future distance in time when an operation is conducted and the propensity among leaders to discount its risks and associated costs.

Poor planning of postconflict operations produces less than desired outcomes often resulting in other enduring destabilizing activities, such as civil war.

Political leaders establish aspirational goals but fail to diligently consider the military means necessary to accomplish them. This lack of engagement leads to political ends that are disconnected from the military realities on the ground. Rapport notes that U.S. history shows that military occupations have succeeded less than one-third of the time since 1815. The premise here is that political leaders fail to adequately listen to and consider the advice of military leaders and intergovernmental or intragovernmental organizations before making policy that leads to war.

Rapport applies CLT while contrasting prevailing theoretical models to four historical war efforts led by the United States. Those cases include World War II (Germany), the Korean War, Vietnam, and Iraq. His analysis supports his argument and proves CLT as a better means of accounting for the U.S. policy decision-making process and the political strategic assessments involved in those military endeavors. These case analyses convincingly demonstrate that political leaders were overly optimistic in the feasibility of noncombat tasks, were unable to visualize how combat operations would affect meeting these tasks, or were unaware of how such tasks and events might help lead to a strategic military end state. Officials also lacked the necessary understanding of the costs of operations and the details of executing them.

Other notable results from the analysis included long-term goals can be disregarded even though they are known to be important; long-term objectives typically lack political aims and feasibility assessments; political and military leaders can be short-sighted; political leaders are essential in determining policy effects; and finally, the personality of leaders influences foreign policy, coupled with time, space, context, political constraints, and information. All results were in line with what CLT predicted.

Rapport concludes that concurrent integrated planning of all phases of war must take place to achieve desired outcomes. There should be a governmental organization created to coordinate combat and noncombat tasks and to assess all that is necessary to execute military operations before the military option chosen. If postconflict efforts are assessed fairly in war